The valuation approach in relation to the model of privatisation for land development adopted by Raji, Fauziah & Kamarudin, Norhaya
 75:11 (2015) 177–184 | www.jurnalteknologi.utm.my | eISSN 2180–3722 | 
 
 
Jurnal 
Teknologi 
 
 
Full Paper 
  
 
  
 
THE VALUATION APPROACH IN RELATION TO THE MODEL 
OF PRIVATISATION FOR LAND DEVELOPMENT ADOPTED 
 
Fauziah Raji*, Norhaya Kamarudin 
 
Faculty of Geoinformation and Real Estate, Universiti Teknologi 
Malaysia, Malaysia 
 
Article history 
Received  
6 April 2015 
Received in revised form  
12 August 2015 
Accepted  
23 August 2015 
 
*Corresponding author 
fauziahraji.kl@utm.my 
 
 
Graphical abstract 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Privatisation of property development has been practiced in Malaysia since the 1980s where it 
not only involved the Federal Government but also the State Governments and the Local 
Governments. The government undertakes privatisation of property development for various 
benefits such as to reduce expenditure, to improve the quality of development and to ensure 
faster delivery of product.  It was observed that valuation of lands involved in the privatisation is 
significant as the valuation determines the returns to the government and costs to the 
developer. Inevitably the valuation will determine whether the privatisation should proceed or 
not. This research investigates the relationship between the model of privatisation adopted 
(MOP) and the approach to valuation for privatisation of property development projects by a 
local authority in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.  The models of privatisation studied are the land swap, 
land lease, and the joint venture developments. Altogether fifteen privatisation projects were 
studied. Data gathered from interviews with key personnel from the identified projects were 
analysed qualitatively. The findings of the research positively report that the model of 
privatisation not only determines the type of valuation to be carried out whether capital or lease 
valuation but also influences the parameters for determining the value.   
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Abstrak 
 
Penswastaan pembangunan hartanah telah diamalkan di Malaysia sejak tahun 1980-an di 
mana ia bukan sahaja melibatkan Kerajaan Persekutuan tetapi juga Kerajaan-kerajaan Negeri 
dan Kerajaan Tempatan. Kerajaan menjalankan penswastaan pembangunan harta tanah 
untuk pelbagai manfaat seperti mengurangkan perbelanjaan, untuk meningkatkan kualiti 
pembangunan dan memastikan penyampaian sesuatu produk dapat dilakukan dengan 
pantas. Adalah diperhatikan bahawa penilaian tanah-tanah yang terlibat dalam penswastaan 
adalah penting kerana penilaian tersebut akan menentukan pulangan terhadap pihak 
kerajaan dan kos kepada pemaju. Tidak dapat disangkal lagi bahawa penilaian yang akan 
menentukan sama ada penswastaan boleh diteruskan atau sebaliknya. Kajian ini mengkaji 
hubungan antara model penswastaan (MOP) yang digunapakai dan pendekatan penilaian 
bagi penswastaan projek-projek pembangunan harta tanah oleh pihak berkuasa tempatan di 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Model-model penswastaan dikaji ialah Penukaran tanah, Pajakan 
tanah dan Pembangunan usahasama. Secara keseluruhan lima belas projek penswastaan 
telah dikaji. Data yang dikumpul daripada temu ramah bersama kakitangan utama dari projek 
yang dikenal pasti telah dianalisis secara kualitatif. Hasil kajian yang positif melaporkan bahawa 
model penswastaan bukan sahaja menentukan jenis penilaian yang akan dijalankan sama ada 
penilaian modal atau pajakan tetapi juga mempengaruhi parameter untuk menentukan nilai. 
 
Kata kunci: Penilaian, model penswastaan, penukaran tanah, pajakan tanah, perkembangan 
usaha sama  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Malaysian government embraced both 
privatisation and private finance initiative (PFI), the 
Guidelines for Privatisation 1985 [1] the Privatisation 
Master Plan 1991 [2] and later Public Private 
Partnership 2000 [3]. It can be said that the Malaysian 
government drew lessons from the British privatisation 
programmes, which proved successful and widely 
respected and emulated [4] by focusing on an 
effective public-private sector partnership [5]. 
Most models of privatisation (MOP) adopted will 
require some sort of asset valuation. The only 
difference is the degree of relevance. The valuation 
carried out should reflect the fair market value6.  While 
agreeing to [6], [7] added that the government had 
a responsibility to its citizens to sell assets at or above 
their market value.  In the advent of formalising the 
Guidelines for Privatisation 1985 [1] the Malaysian 
Government had already realised the significance of 
valuation and pricing of assets involved in any 
privatisation. The guidelines stressed on the absolute 
necessity to arrive at the current market value of the 
involved assets.  Later in 2009, the government issued 
the Public Private Partnership (PPP) guidelines [3] to 
facilitate the introduction of Private Finance Initiative 
in 2006 through the 9th Malaysia plan. The PPP 
guideline while advocating performance and 
measurement of the PPP projects was silent on how to 
value such projects. Hence it is assumed that issues on 
valuation as mentioned in the prior Guidelines for 
Privatisation 1985 [1] still apply. 
[1] pointed out that valuation was necessary as it 
formed the basis for estimating the value of assets and 
for putting a price on the shares of companies, which 
will take over the privatised assets. This view was 
echoed in the Privatisation Master Plan Malaysia 
(PMP) 1991 [2]. The valuation carried out should reflect 
the fair market value [1], [6], [8].    
The [2] has recommended that in valuing the 
development site for privatisation there is a need to 
allow for encumbrances, which can mean physical 
encumbrances such as squatters, or title 
encumbrances such restrictions in interest or special 
conditions, or legal encumbrances such as the 
Heritage Act. 
The literature has suggested that in sales of State 
Owned Entities (SOE), some undervaluation of the 
assets had occurred [9], [10]. Although property is 
normally only a small part in the overall value of a 
company or utility, unforeseen profits made on 
property transactions after privatisation have stressed 
the need to have property valuations carried out by 
professional valuers [9]. For example in the 
privatisation of Rover cars to British Aerospace in 1988, 
it was reported that British Aerospace later sold off 
parts of Rover for substantial profits mainly from 
property sales, raising queries regarding 
undervaluation of assets.  A similar problem arose over 
the privatisation of Royal Ordinance factories in 1989 
to British Aerospace, which again resulted in large 
profits from sale of property, hence again raising 
questions of undervaluation of assets at the time of 
privatisation [10, 11]. While the literature is biased 
towards undervaluation of assets, cases of 
overvaluation of assets might have occurred as well.  
Only such situations have not been highlighted. 
However selling at above market could have adverse 
results, as explained by [7], buyers who overpay for an 
asset cannot meet their target from the acquisition.   
Privatisation of property development is on case-by-
case basis. [7] explained that in case-by-case 
privatisation as opposed to mass privatisation, value is 
of fundamental importance to both the host 
government and the developer.  On one hand, the 
government has a moral responsibility to ensure the 
privatisation adheres to market value and the disposal 
should either be market value or above market value.  
Any value below market is not an option.  On the other 
hand, the developer too has target returns to meet 
and any value above market could adversely affect 
their targeted returns. 
This paper is based on a study of fifteen privatisation 
property development projects undertaken with 
Kuala Lumpur City Hall (DBKL). The MOPs involved 
were Land Swap (LS), Land Lease (LL) and Joint 
Venture (JV).  The qualitative research methodology 
was adopted and purposive sampling was carried 
out. 
 
 
2.0  PRIVATISATION MODELS 
 
The definition of privatisation has set the pathway to 
the models of privatisation (MOP) that can be 
adopted. In the case of Malaysia, the PMP identified 
several modes of privatisation namely sale of assets, 
lease of assets, management contracts and the 
concession based build operate transfer (BOT) and 
build operate (BO). In the 7th Malaysia Plan several 
other MOPs were also mentioned such as the 
management buyout (MBO), land swap (LS) and build 
lease transfer (BLT). To quote the 7MP (1996-2000): “The 
introduction of the new modes arose from an 
expanded scope of privatisation as well as to 
accommodate the requirements of more innovative 
proposals submitted by the private sector”. To further 
facilitate innovative land development, the 7MP 
(1996-2000) also allowed development rights over river 
reserves, air and subterranean space. Although not 
specifically mentioned other MOPs commonly 
adopted in Malaysia include the joint venture (JV), 
deregulation and liberalisation [12]. Efforts then were 
made to formulate appropriate legislature and 
policies for such provisions where necessary. 
In this research three MOPs of privatisation were 
studied in detail, namely the Land Swap (LS). Land 
Lease (LL) and the Joint Venture (JV). The modus 
operandi of each MOP was researched in theory and 
practice especially in relation to the adaptations to 
suit DBKL which was the party allowing such 
privatisations.   
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2.1  Land Swap 
 
In the Malaysian context of privatisation, the land 
swap means transferring land to another party in 
return for benefits in kind. In other words it is the 
transferring of government land to a developer in 
return for benefits in the form of land development. In 
this mode there are two forms of development 
involved, one is the government facility and the other 
is the developer’s development on the swap site. The 
returns to the developer are directly related to the 
development on the swap site. Here returns to the 
developer are then very dependent to economic and 
property market trends. Nevertheless being a 
privatisation the government has the prerogative to 
influence the type of development on the swap site. 
Privatisation via land swap is normally private 
initiated. Swap sites targeted are normally within 
choice commercial areas but are underutilised with 
existing government facilities or vacant.  It can be said 
that asset swap is location reliant [13]. Under this mode 
of privatisation, the land value of the swap site is of 
ultimate importance, since this value will determine 
the returns to the government. In other words cost of 
building the government facilities will be equivalent to 
the value of the swap site [14], [13].  Thus it is of utmost 
importance for the land valuations to be carried out 
professionally. This mode of privatisation has a 
tendency to limit the location for development as 
both returns to government and developer is 
dependent on the land value of the swap land. 
With reference to the study area, the LS developers 
specified they had to build the Kuala Lumpur City Hall 
(DBKL) required facilities before they could access the 
swap land. The building of the DBKL facilities would be 
equivalent to the value of the swap site. The swap 
lands will only be transferred to the developers after 
completing the said DBKL facilities. A good example is 
the Mid-Valley Mega Mall, the developer had to 
develop several blocks of low cost housing 
apartments for DBKL in return for the land to develop 
the mall and related development. 
2.2  Land Lease 
 
The land lease is considered as a variant of the 
concession based MOP. Concessions have been 
explained as a means by which the government 
transfers operation and developing rights to the 
private sector for an agreed period of time.  Under this 
mode the concessionaire takes responsibility for 
capital expenditure and investments [15]. During the 
concession period, the developer has the right to 
receive revenues or other benefits from the operation 
of the government facility. Upon expiry of the 
concession period, the facility reverts back to the 
government at no cost. The main difference being 
that in a land lease the land is leased to the developer 
for a certain period of time. 
The Land Lease MOP involves the government 
leasing the site to the developer for a certain period.  
The developer is then allowed to develop the site and 
collect rental or fees from the operations [14].  Land to 
be developed by the lessee is usually leased for a 
period of 15-30 years [16]. The period of lease is 
important as longer agreements encourage the 
private party to make more significant investments 
and to take other steps to build up the business [16]. 
A point of contention is the allowed use of the leased 
land.  On one hand if land leased to the private sector 
is without restriction or constraint on its use, then its 
opportunity value is the price, which would be 
obtained from the highest bidder associated with the 
optimum use of the land and the revenue streams that 
they can generate. If the land is leased for providing 
a specific service or there are constraints attached, 
then the value to the bidder will be limited to its 
revenue potential for the designated use [16]. 
Based on the explanations by the LL developers, 
there are two approaches involved. Two of 
privatisations involved leasing lands from DBKL for 
periods of between 15 to 20 years. The developers 
under this approach explained that they were 
allowed to develop the sites and rent out the 
development during the concession period, but they 
were not allowed to charge the development land. 
The LL developers specified that they were allowed to 
rent out their development for a period not exceeding 
three years at a stretch. The second approach 
involved privatisation of the operation of DBKL 
facilities. Here the developer explained that they 
leased DBKL land and was allowed to build a DBKL 
facility which they could operate and collect fees. The 
land lease period is about 30 years and the developer 
was not allowed to charge the development site. The 
fees for the allowed operation were fixed in the 
privatisation agreement.  
 
2.3  Joint Venture 
 
Joint venture (JV) is another model of privatisation. The 
implication of JVs is that both the public sector and 
private sector wish to share the risks and benefits 
associated with a particular enterprise. In many 
instances JVs are attractive to both the public and the 
private sector for a number of reasons. For the public 
sector, JVs ensure a continued and sometimes 
controlling interest in management and operations as 
well as share of anticipated profits while getting 
desired managerial and investment inputs. For the 
private party, joint ventures can indicate a 
governmental commitment to assist a successful 
enterprise as well as reducing the level of investment 
and risk [16], [17], [18]. The returns to both parties will 
be negotiated [19]. Such negotiations are usually with 
regards to the percentage in profit sharing, risk 
management and equity. 
[18] noted that through joint venture development 
schemes issues of risks could be addressed.  The risks 
addressed would usually relate to funding facilities 
and skilled personnel and expertise [18]. The project 
involved has to have commercial value and the 
negotiated returns have to be sufficiently attractive to 
both parties.  The parties share risks and rewards in 
180                                 Abdul Qayyum Nazri et al. / Jurnal Teknologi (Sciences & Engineering) 75:11 (2015) 177–184 
 
 
proportion to either their shareholding portion or some 
other agreed contractual arrangement [17]. 
Enquires made to the JV developers n the study area 
revealed that, DBKL is the landowner and they were 
the developers. The developers had to pay DBKL the 
market value of the development land as well as 
share profits with DBKL in return for the right to develop 
the site.  Under this model the developers were also 
not allowed to charge the development site to secure 
loan financing.  They were to secure loan financing on 
their own using their financial strength and credibility. 
Based on the study, the developers had at least five 
to eight years experience in land development. 
Furthermore based on their project size, they were 
committed to the JV and had sufficient financing 
facilities to complete the privatisation. 
The developers also clarified that they need not pay 
the total land value immediately.  They were allowed 
to pay the land value to the Local Authority according 
to the phase of development.  Nonetheless the 
payment had to be paid before the developers were 
allowed to begin development of the each phase.  
The JV developers had to secure financing to pay for 
the land value and also to develop the site. What 
helped was that the proceeds from the sales of the 
earlier development phases went to the developer 
and were used to offset the next phase of 
development. 
 
 
3.0  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This research is qualitative and adopted comparative 
case study approach. The privatisation projects 
studied involved three models of privatisation, which 
were land Swap, Land Lease and Joint Venture.  The 
privatisation projects were grouped within each 
model and comparatively studied within the model.  
Next comparison was made between the three 
models. Although nineteen projects were identified, 
only fifteen agreed to be interviewed and participate. 
The breakdown of the projects according to the 
model is graphically illustrated below in Figure 1. The 
projects researched were also grouped and 
organised in terms of ownership and returns and a 
synthesis is presented in Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 1  Synthesis of projects according to privatisation model
 
 
Figure 1 Privatisation of property development projects 
 
Data collected was both secondary and primary.  
Secondary data referred to published data such as 
extracted from published articles, economic reports, 
economic budgets, property market reports, and 
house price indexes. Such data showed and 
substantiated the rising and falling trends of economic 
factors in accordance with economic fluctuations, 
such as interest rates, inflation, property values, and 
loan value. 
Primary data was collected through interviews 
conducted and on site observations of identified 
projects. The instrumentation adopted was a semi 
structured interview schedule. A purposive sampling 
was carried out and relevant respondents were 
identified. The respondents were top personnel 
Project Development Site Ownership Returns to DBKL Returns to 
Developers 
MOP 
Number 
of sites 
DBKL Developer Land 
value 
(cash) 
Land 
value 
(cash 
and in 
kind) 
Land 
value (in 
kind) 
Leas
e 
renta
l 
(cash
) 
Sales of 
development 
Rental 
income 
from 
developme
nt 
Operation 
fees from 
developme
nt 
 
LS1 2 √ √   √  √   LS 
LS2 2 √ √   √  √   LS 
LL1 1 √     √ √ √  LL 
LL2 1 √     √ √ √  LL 
LL3 1 √     √ √  √ LL 
JV1 1 √   √   √   JV 
JV2 1 √   √   √   JV 
JV3 1 √  √    √   JV 
JV4 1 √  √    √   JV 
JV5 1 √  √    √   JV 
JV6 1 √  √    √   JV 
JV7 1 √  √    √   JV 
JV8 1 √  √    √   JV 
JV9 1 √   √   √   JV 
Land 
Swap; 2
Land 
Lease; 5
Joint 
Venture; 
12
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identified in each privatisation project. In deciding on 
the respondents from each company, discussions had 
been conducted with the officers from the DBKL 
Privatisation Unit, followed by recommendations from 
the privatisation company itself. Based on the above 
then only was the choice made on the respondents to 
be interviewed from each privatisation company. This 
then followed that the respondents interviewed were 
either the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) or a person 
in the top management of the various development 
companies, it can be concluded these personnel 
knew the project well and could be trusted to be the 
mouthpiece and represent the company.  Being the 
CEOs or part of the top management, the 
respondents were aware of all the details related to 
the privatisation project and hence made choice 
respondents. 
To ease identifying and analysing data all the 
projects studied were coded. The coding LS were for 
land swap MOP and numbered LS1 and LS2, LL was for 
the land lease MOP and numbered LL1 to LL3 whilst JV 
for the joint venture MOP and numbered JV1 to JV10.  
 
 
4.0  RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
The interviews carried out revealed much information 
on the relevance of the valuation to the privatisation 
projects. The responses revealed that MOP decided 
on the approach of valuation to be carried out 
whether capital or lease rental valuation.  The capital 
value referred to is the value of the development site. 
Usually the development site is valued when the 
privatisation involved is a land swap or a JV. In the 
case of the land swap model of privatisation the swap 
site is valued. For the JV MOP the joint development 
site is valued. The lease rental refers to the lease rental 
of the development site that the developer had to 
pay to DBKL.  In a land lease privatisation the lease 
rentals determined were based on ground leases of 
the development site. 
Across the MOPs all the developers agreed that the 
valuations carried out had dual purpose. One purpose 
was to determine the viability of the privatisation to 
DBKL and as mentioned by LL3, the valuations carried 
out were “Just to determine the returns to DBKL in 
cash.”  Here viability to DBKL meant that the returns to 
DBKL whether in terms of cash or kind was sufficient for 
DBKL to proceed with the privatisation in question.  LS2 
quoted, “The land value of the swap site determined 
the returns in kind TO DBKL.  The issue here is whether 
the swap land value is sufficient to build all the DBKL 
required returns.” 
The other purpose was to determine whether it was 
viable for the developer to proceed with the 
privatisation since the land value becomes part of 
project cost. Developer LL2 quoted, “The lease rental 
is reasonable for the developer to proceed.” The 
quote reflects that on the reverse should the valuation 
was too high then the developer might not be able to 
proceed with the privatisation because their returns 
might not suffice. 
 
4.1  Models of privatisation 
 
As contended the MOP had influence on the value of 
sites involved in the privatisation. The results from the 
interviews confirmed such debate.  
 
i. Land Swap 
 
The advantage of land swap is that the DBKL 
obligations would usually be taken care of in the return 
development, which is in kind to DBKL. Obligations 
usually refer to social housing and amenities. Since the 
swap site would be transferred to the developer upon 
completion of DBKL facilities and development, the 
development on the swap site would be subject to 
normal planning requirements. Hence from this it can 
be concurred that the development proposal on the 
swap site would reflect the highest and best use on 
the site which translates to market value.  This could 
explain why the land swap model has the highest 
project cost among the three models. 
 
ii. Land Lease 
 
Two situations arise here. One involved a privatised 
operational facility and other two involved 
commercial development. In the case of the 
privatised facility, the valuation was based on the 
income generated from operating the facility.  As for 
the other two privatisations, the valuations were 
based on the income to be generated through lease 
rental of the completed development proposal. In 
such privatisations, DBKL had set certain conditions for 
the commercial development such as the buildings 
had to be low rise and could be dismantled easily 
upon expiry of the concession. This indicates that the 
valuation cannot be based on the highest and best 
use.  In the case of the privatised DBKL facility, the 
valuation was based on the income generated from 
the privatised facility. Again this would not reflect the 
highest and best use allowed for the site but rather 
what is required by DBKL. Furthermore DBKL fixed the 
rates for the developer to collect from the clients of 
the privatised facility.  It can be concluded that the 
valuation for both situations is lower than the market 
value of the site.  This point was brought up by LL3, who 
depicted that although the lease rental was below 
market, the fixed rates for facility use were also below 
market rates. 
iii. Joint Venture 
 
The difference with the land swap is that for the JV, all 
of DBKL obligations would have to be included in the 
development proposal, such as low cost housing, low 
medium cost housing and medium cost housing, 
together with all the required amenities.  Again here 
while the development proposal can still reflect the 
highest and best use, the possibility of more than 
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normal social housing and increased Bumiputra quota 
can be included. With reference to planning issues, 
the JV developers did stress that the Bumiputra quota 
for sales was increased to 50 percent from the normal 
30 percent imposed. The JV developers responded 
that the increase in Bumiputra quota tended to slow 
sales, which affected their cash flow. Since this 
situation is not normal it can affect projected income 
to the project and arrive at a land value, which is less 
than market. Furthermore as claimed by some of the 
JV developers DBKL tended to request for more public 
facilities since it was a privatisation. Clearly, since DBKL 
is the landowner, this is a good opportunity for DBKL to 
more than just fulfil its social obligations to residents, 
especially for those in the lower income group. 
Therefore, we can observe that the market value is 
achieved from the land swap model of privatisation.  
As for the land lease model, the valuation would be 
below the market value.  Finally for the JV model of 
privatisation it is very likely for the valuation to be 
below the market value as well. 
In retrospect, the LS developers would be accorded 
the highest land value for them to secure the 
privatisation. Such a situation in reality does not assist, 
as their returns in kind to DBKL will cost more. The LL 
developers would generally be accorded a land 
value below market. Topped up with periodical 
regular payments, the LL developers tend to gain.  
Finally the JV developers could enjoy a slightly below 
than market land value.  Coupled with payments to 
DBKL, which are phase based, the JV developers 
would be better off than the LS developers. 
 
4.2  Planning Issues 
 
Results from the interviews revealed that the MOP 
could cause certain constraints to the development 
proposals, while some MOPs imposed additional 
requirements to the developer. 
i. Development Constraints 
From the response of the land lease developers, which 
is concession based it was observed that the MOP laid 
constraints on the development potential of the site. 
For example, this MOP only allowed low-rise 
developments that used lightweight construction 
material, which allows for easy dismantle and 
removal. The inference here is that a situation may 
arise which requires DBKL to demolish or dismantle the 
development for another user. Hence in this situation, 
the MOP does not allow for the site to be developed 
to its highest and best potential. 
It was observed that the LL privatisations had small 
land areas comparatively to the LS and JV 
privatisations of between 1 to 2 acres.  It was also 
observed that LL1 and LL2 were niche sites, which 
were reserves for road and drain.  In other words the 
LL MOP allows for creative and innovative 
development. 
The JV developers had issues with the MOP.  Due to 
changing economic climate the final density of the 
development could differ from the original plan 
submitted with the privatisation agreement.  The point 
of contention here is that if the final density is higher 
than the submitted original, the returns to DBKL would 
be taken care of through profit sharing, but if the final 
density is less than the original submitted, the 
developer still had to maintain the original minimum 
gross profit (MGP) agreed to the local authority. 
Land development is a long process and in the JV 
privatisation, the low cost housing is usually built over 
several phases. Not all low cost housing were built in 
phase one. Such development strategy has 
sometimes caused the JV developers to get caught in 
new policies and guidelines required for low cost 
housing development. The changing policies normally 
involved increase in the number of rooms and 
minimum built up area. New policies while good for 
the purchasers meant extra costs for the JV 
developers. 
Interestingly, the LS developers were not substantially 
affected by change in development policies or 
requirements much because the LS developers had to 
build the DBKL return facilities first before they could 
develop the swap site.  Hence the LS developers were 
less susceptible to inclusion of newer development 
policies and guidelines than the JV developers. 
ii. Bumiputra Quota 
 
Several JV developers also mentioned that for the JV 
privatisations, the Bumiputra quota was increased to 
50 percent from the usual 30 percent. This does have 
bearing especially in the Non - Bumiputra dominated 
areas as sales would be affected. The JV developers 
aired these grouses only and it was analysed that in a 
JV, DBKL as the JV partner has other agendas such as 
urban renewal, relocation of people and improving 
social conditions. Although these developers clarified 
that DBKL allowed them to reduce the Bumiputra 
quota for certain phases, they had to make up for in 
the other phases. This is because on the overall the 
development scheme had to have a 50 percent 
Bumiputra quota.  DBKL explained that the imposition 
of 50 percent Bumiputra quota was to meet their 
objectives set and the best way to achieve this was 
through the JV privatisation since they were the 
landowners. DBKL explained they also assist in 
marketing the Bumiputra unit. 
Therefore it was observed that when the JV partner 
is the Local Authority as well, there was a tendency for 
the LA to impose extra conditions to meet their target 
social objectives. While this is good for the LA and the 
public at large it can be detrimental for the developer 
involved. 
 
4.3  Documentation 
i. Sales and Purchase Agreements 
 
Since under the JV MOP, the landowner is DBKL 
therefore all Sales and Purchase Agreements (SPA) 
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involved will be tripartite between, DBKL as the 
landowner, the developer and the purchaser. There 
were complains from the JV developers that DBKL was 
not timely in signing the SPA and this resulted in the 
developers getting the 10 % down payment late.  This 
is a weakness attached with the joint venture model 
of privatisation. DBKL admits this problem arises but 
reiterates that it is an administrative problem, which 
can be remedied through cooperation between both 
DBKL and the developer.  This problem does not arise 
with the LS developers, as they are the owners of the 
swap site, thus all SPAs only involved themselves and 
the purchaser. Similarly the LL developers too were not 
affected as only they and the tenants were parties to 
the rental agreement.  
 
ii. Conditions in Privatisation Agreement 
 
A majority of the JV developers agreed that the 
model of privatisation had bearing on the valuation 
carried out.  Their thoughts are summarised as follows: 
 
1 This is because the valuation was based on 
the development proposal of low cost and low 
medium cost housing. 
2 The valuation was based on the decided 
selling price following DBKL requirements and 
agreement.  
 
A JV developer also commented that the valuer 
involved had to be aware of the bullish and bearish 
runs in terms of the property cycle since property 
development is usually carried out for a number of 
years. Overall it was observed that the JV developers 
were more sensitive to the effect of the privatisation 
model in relation to the land valuation.   
 
4.4  Site Issues 
 
From Figure 2, it was observed that the JV developers 
had more physical land problems.  It appeared that 
their sites were initially either landfills, or had mining 
pools and fishponds.  All the JV developers 
interviewed unanimously agreed they had to settle 
the site problems on their own. Many JV developers 
remarked that DBKL should play a bigger role in solving 
the problems, as it is a JV between them and DBKL. 
They opined that the model did not assist, since DBKL 
was lacking in its role as a JV partner.  DBKL explained 
that in the privatisation they are the landowner and 
the right to develop had been given to the developer. 
Therefore the developer had to correct the entire 
physical problem on their own as with any private 
developers.  However DBKL did clarify they would 
assist if it were within their capacity. 
 
Figure 2 Site physical and geographical conditions 
 
 
4.5  Request for Revaluation 
Across the three models, only some developers 
adopting the JV (3) and Land swap (1) requested for 
a revaluation.  Figure 3 below reflects the above: 
Figure 3 Request for revaluation 
 
 
It was noted that developers who requested for 
revaluation before the agreement was signed were 
entertained as quoted by JV2 “The land use was 
changed after the valuation was fixed but before the 
signing of the agreement.  Hence, a revaluation was 
allowed.” 
Those who applied for revaluation after the 
agreement was signed were not entertained. Here it 
can be inferred that changing certain elements in the 
agreement after it was signed was not allowed. It was 
also deduced that since for the LS the value reflected 
the market and for the JV the value arrived at was 
near market value, the request for revaluation is 
understandable as the value is high. For the LL since 
the value can be inferred as below market value, 
there was no request for revaluation. 
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5.0  CONCLUSION 
 
In terms of valuation, the MOP not only determined 
the type of valuation to be carried out that is whether 
capital or lease valuation but also influenced the 
value arrived at.   
All the three MOPs researched had influences on the 
valuation approach. Parameters that affected the 
valuation were planning issues such development 
constraints and Bumiputra quota. Documentations 
such as the SPA, and the conditions in the privatisation 
agreement also played a role in impacting the 
valuation. Of the three MOPs studied, it was observed 
that the LL and JV were most susceptible to the MOP. 
On one hand although the site for the privatisation 
project was not determined by the MOP, there was a 
tendency for the LS privatisations to be better placed 
with less physical issues. On the other hand the JV 
privatisations tended to locate in areas, which had 
physical issues. Site conditions tended to affect its 
value. 
In light of the above findings, it is recommended that 
the valuer involved adopt a method of valuation, 
which can cover all the factors and parameters 
highlighted. It is suggested that the discounted cash 
flow technique be utilised. 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
The authors wish to acknowledge the University 
Teknology Malaysia for providing infrastructure for the 
research work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
[1] Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Department. 1985. 
Guidelines on Privatization. Government Printers. 
[2] Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Department. 1991. 
Malaysian Privatization Master Plan. Government Printers. 
[3] Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Department, 
Malaysia. 2009. Privatisation Partnership Guideline. 
Government Printers. 
[4] Mokhtar, Khairiah Salwa. 2008. Privatisation Malaysia 
Airlines. Penerbit UKM. 
[5] Evans, A. 2004. Rail Safety and Rail Privatisation in Britain, 
Inaugural Lecture of Imperial College London. Organiz. 
23(1): 109-128.  
[6] Kerekes, J. 1993. Valuation and Privatisation. OECD.  
[7] Welch, Dick and Fremond, Oliver. March 1998. Case-by-
Case Privatization – Detailed outline. World Bank. 
[8] Mani Usilappan. 2006. Real Estate in Malaysia, Challenges, 
Insights and Issues. University of Malaya Press, Kuala 
Lumpur.  
[9] Rigden, Amanda and Fisher, Peter. 1995. The Property 
Aspects of Privatization. Journal of Property Valuation & 
Investment. 13(2): 41-50. 
[10] Griffiths, Alan and Wall, Stuart. 1999. Applied Economics.  
An Introductory Course. 8th ed. London: Pearson education 
Limited. 
[11] Feigenbaum, Harvey, Henig, Jeffrey, Hamnett, Chris. 1999. 
Shrinking the State, the Political Underpinnings of 
Privatization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
[12] Omar, I and Raji, F. 2011. Privatisation Projects in Kuala 
Lumpur, Emerald Case Studies April 2011. ISSN: 2045-0621. 
[13] Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Department, 
Malaysia. 1993. Privatization In Malaysia. Government 
Printers 
[14] Attorney General’s Chambers, Guidelines on Privatization. 
www.agc.gov.my/agc/.../4_20- 
220guidelines_on_privatization.pdf extracted 21 April 2010. 
[15] Simmons, Patrick. 2001. Some privatization considerations, 
Port Technology International. 21-24. 
[16] UNESCAP. 1997. Guidelines for Private Participation in Ports. 
United Nation, New York. 
[17] Cadman, David and Topping, Rosalyn. 1995. Property 
Development. 4th Ed. London and New York: E & F Spon. 
[18] Millington, A. F. 2000. Property Development. United 
kingdom: Estate Gazettes. 
[19] Stevenson,Robert, Potts, Keith, Houlton, Loraine. 1994. Joint 
Venture Vehicles in property Development. Property 
Management.12(2): 16-21. 
 
